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In standard neo-classical economics, efficiency and equity issues are largely treated as 
separate and separable issues.  In this paper, I will discuss findings from four strands of 
literature that challenge this separability and in fact suggest that greater equity will promote 
greater efficiency in the sense of maximizing well-being in a society.  There four strands refer 
to findings from the experimental literature on the importance of equity or fairness, the 
subjective well-being literature on the importance of relative incomes and inequality on 
subjective well-being, the distribution-adjusted well-being literature that combines measures 
of mean incomes with measures of income inequality to derive at welfare judgements across 
space and time, and the literature on the relationship between income and gender inequality 
on economic growth.   Some implications for research and policy are explored.   
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1 I want to thank Irene van Staveren for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.   1.  Introduction 
 
In standard neo-classical economics, efficiency and equity issues are largely treated as 
separate and separable issues.  This is formalized in the two laws of welfare economics where 
the first law is focused on efficiency and the second law addresses the possibility to achieve 
redistribution while maintaining efficiency.  The main reason for this separation lies in the 
rather narrow criterion of Pareto optimality as the central welfare economic concept, which 
also the key concept used in the two laws of welfare economics.  Since Pareto optimality is 
really only a criterion of efficiency, welfare economic judgments of different Pareto optimal 
outcomes are not possible and are seen as normative issues outside the scope of neo-classical 
economics.  The evolution of neo-classical welfare economics leading to this situation has 
been recounted and analyzed many times and need not detain us here (see e.g. Sen 1999 for an 
account).  The central motivating factor has been the reluctance to engage in inter-personal 
welfare comparisons, for which, following Robbins (1935), there is no sound scientific 
foundation.  Such welfare comparisons are seen as inherently normative questions are 
therefore outside the purview of positive economic analysis.   
 
While this is the standard orthodoxy, several applied fields of economics are happily engaging 
in distributional judgments including implicit inter-personal comparisons (or related devices).  
For example, the classic case for free trade in the two goods- two factor world of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model shows that free trade between a capital rich but labor poor country 
and a capital poor and labor rich country is beneficial is based on the belief that the larger 
monetary gains to the winners (capitalists in the capital abundant and labor in the labor 
abundant country) are able to overcompensate the losers of such trade openness (labor in the 
capital abundant and capital in the labor abundant country), i.e. it includes a clear judgment 
about inter-personal welfare comparisons.
2  Similarly, the use of representative agent models 
in macroeconomics simply assumes away the distributional question, and thereby implies that 
they can satisfactorily be solved if only efficiency is maintained.  Thus in these cases, 
efficiency in the sense of maximizing overall resources available to society is the central 
focus, with equity and distributional issues being swept under the carpet.           
 
                                                 
2 No attention is paid to the question whether this compensation actually has taken place either.  There is a whole 
literature on compensation criteria that also allow for inter-personal comparisons of welfare under certain 
restrictions.  See, Arrow (1963) and Sen (1973b) for a discussion. 
  2 This is not to say that equity issues have not been analyzed by economists working within and 
outside the neo-classical tradition.  In fact, starting from Atkinson (1970), Sen (1973a), Rawls 
(1971) to Roemer (1998) a large literature concerned with the analysis of (income) inequality 
has developed.  This literature derived measures of inequality, studied their relationship to 
conceptions of social welfare and various view of ethics and moral philosophy, and argued 
about the theoretical merits of various approaches to equity analysis.  The impact of this 
literature has been powerful both in terms of economic analysis as well as applied research.  
A prominent recent example is the latest World Development Report by the World Bank 
(2005) which is on Equity in Development and operationalizes equity as equality of 
opportunities, largely as suggested by Roemer (1998).   
 
But the impact on the economics profession of this conceptual inequality literature has been 
limited and is seen largely as a useful guide to normative economics rather than approaches 
that challenge the standard focus on efficiency analysis.   
 
The purpose of this essay is to briefly discuss the emergence of four strands of literature that 
seem to challenge this separation between efficiency and equity issues.  With a focus on 
efficiency issues I refer to economic analyses that implicitly (or explicitly) assume that 
maximizing total resources in society is also maximizing well-being in that society,
3 while a 
focus on equity is examining the desirability of various distributional arrangements.  In fact, I 
will argue that these four strands of the literature support the view that equity and 
distributional considerations are critical for maximizing well-being in a society and thus that, 
loosely speaking, ‘equity’ matters for ‘efficiency’.  These strands are, respectively, the 
experimental literature on equity and fairness, the empirical literature on subjective well-
being, the related empirical literature on inequality-adjusted well-being, and the theoretical 
and empirical literature on inequality-growth linkages.   
 
The central argument of this essay is that the combined impact of these four strands of the 
literature points to the need for a serious re-think of the traditional separation between 
efficiency and equity issues.  In fact, a case can be made that equity concerns are central 
‘positive’ economics issues and much of this literature in fact suggests that greater equity is a 
good way to promote greater efficiency.  The essay will briefly outline the key findings from 
these literatures in turn and then comment on their combined impact for economic analysis.    
                                                 
3 For a more detailed discussion, see Grün and Klasen (2003) on the implicit assumptions that are made when 
linking incomes and well-being in a society.    
  3 
2) Equity and Fairness: The Experimental Literature 
 
Experimental economics has developed into a major field of research within economics in the 
past 10-15 years.  An important recent focus of experiments has been to test whether key 
results derived from standard (selfish) utility maximization hold in experiments and whether 
equity issues play a role in explaining these results.  If equity is seen as an important 
motivating factor for individual behavior, then it would need to be included in standard 
models of utility maximization and thus an isolated consideration of efficiency, as derived 
from individualistic utility maximization, would not be tenable. 
 
Three types of experiments are of particular relevance for answering this question.  First, 
there is considerable experimental evidence on highly stylized division games between two 
players, the most prominent being the so-called dictator and ultimatum games.  In the former 
a dictator decides on the allocation of a pay-off and the other player can only accept or reject 
the offer made which only affects his/her pay-off.  In the latter ultimatum game, an offer is 
made by the proposer but if the other person rejects the offer, neither receives the pay-off.  In 
both games, the dominant strategy would be for the proposer to offer next to nothing and for 
the other person to accept but there is a huge literature now demonstrating this is not the case, 
and this is the case in different cultural backgrounds, different pay-offs, different framings, 
anonymity of the players, etc. (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, World Bank, 2005; Hoffman et 
al. 1996; Engelman and Strobel, 2005, etc.).  In fact, in both games, the proposers offer a 
substantial share of the pay-off to the other person, with an equal division sometime being the 
modal offer.
4  The most common explanations for this behavior is a concern for equity or 
fairness and different versions of such models have been proposed (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002).  While there are differences 
between these models, all reject the notion that people are individual utility-maximizers and 
thus reject the separability between efficiency and equity.  In fact, greater equity improves 
individual and aggregate well-being and is thus ‘efficient’ in this sense.   
 
A second type of experiments are so-called ‘leaky bucket’ experiments where a trade-off 
between equity and efficiency is studied explicitly to determine the relative importance of 
inequality aversion vis-à-vis concerns for efficiency.  In such experiments, subjects are asked 
                                                 
4 Also, often the other player rejects an offer that is deemed ‘unfairly’ low.   
  4 about the desirability of redistribution from a richer person to a poorer person depending on 
the sums of money that get ‘lost’ in the transfer (see Okun, 1975 and Cowell 1985).  Based on 
such experiments one can then deduce the amount of inequality aversion directly.   Results 
from such studies reveal that clearly inequality aversion exists, i.e. that subjects find it 
desirable to transfer resources from rich to poor persons even is some of the transfer gets lost 
in the process suggesting again that greater equity is preferred even if the overall pie to be 
redistributed is shrunk as a result (e.g. Amiel, Creedy, and Hurn, 1999).  The magnitude of 
determined inequality aversion, however, is relatively small, which might be related to some 
resistance to such ‘arbitrary’ redistribution schemes (Carlsson et al. 2005).   
 
A third set of experiments are experiments about hypothetical societies where subjects are 
asked about preferences for income distributions affecting their grandchildren.  In these 
experiments, the set-up is chosen to separate risk aversion from inequality aversion to see 
whether the reason for inequality aversion is simply a result of risk aversion or whether it 
exists above and beyond risk aversion.
5  Results by Carlsson et al. (2005) suggest that 
inequality aversion is quite large, exists over and above risk aversion, is related to ideological 
preferences and appears to be larger among females.
6   
 
All three types of experiments convey the clear message that inequality aversion or a concern 
for fairness is an important motivation of economic agents.  Apparently, people are willing to 
trade off the size of the pie for lower inequality in the distribution, although there appears to 
be substantial heterogeneity between people and between settings (see Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999; World Bank, 2005).  In many cases, even Pareto superior solutions are rejected out of a 
concern for great equity.  Consequently, an exclusive focus on achieving efficiency seems to 
be misplaced and does not conform to people’s preferences.   
 
3) Inequality and Happiness: The Subjective Well-Being Literature 
 
                                                 
5 In one experiment, subjects are asked to choose an income distribution where their grandchildren have an equal 
probability to be anywhere in that distribution to test for risk aversion.  In the inequality aversion experiment, 
subjects are again asked to choose an income distribution but this time the income of their grandchild was fixed 
and known to be the mean income of the distribution.  This distinction between risk aversion and inequality 
aversion is also important for assessing the theory of justice by Rawls which makes use of the thought 
experiment of the original position.  In some of his writings Rawls motivated our agreement to a society where 
the well-being of the worst off individual is particularly high by risk aversion (we fear we could be the worst off 
after the veil of ignorance has been lifted).  Inequality aversion that goes beyond risk aversion would seem to be 
stronger argument to support his claims about the social contract that would be reached in the original position. 
6 See also Kroll and Davidovitz (2003) for a related experiment.   
  5Another approach to study the importance of equity for efficiency is to tackle the problem of 
well-being comparisons head-on using survey evidence.   This is a new research field that has 
developed in the past 10 years and focuses mainly on analyzing answers about reported 
‘happiness’ or reported ‘life satisfaction’ (e.g. Frey and Stutzer, 2002).  While there are many 
questions and issues about the reliability and interpretability of responses to these questions, a 
number of rather robust results have emerged from this literature.  Among the factors 
influencing happiness is a pronounced non-linear age effect and the importance of personal 
work and family circumstances (with unemployment and divorce leading to much lower 
reported happiness or life satisfaction) (e.g. Frey and Stutzer, 2002).  More important for our 
purpose is the relationship between income and reported happiness or life satisfaction.  Here 
some very robust results exist.  First, there is a clear positive (but log-linear rather than linear) 
relationship between income levels and reported well-being within a society.  Being richer at 
a given point in time increases well-being, but the increments of reported well-being decline 
with income levels (e.g. Easterlin, 1995, Clark and Oswald, 1995, Clark et al. 2005).
7  This in 
itself will assure that inequality reduces aggregate well-being as the excess of income (over 
and above mean incomes) accruing to the rich generate lower additional well-being than the 
well-being losses associated with the income deficit (compared to mean incomes) of the poor.   
 
Second, income growth in a society does not appear to have a noticeable impact on reported 
well-being.  While in some studies a small positive effect is found, in many others there is no 
effect whatever suggesting that rising average incomes in a country have only a very (if any) 
impact on reported well-being (Easterlin, 1995; Frey and Stutzer, 2002).  Third, there appears 
to be considerable evidence that inequality reduces perceived well-being, over and above the 
effect it has on individual income levels (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2003, Alesina et al. 
2004).
8   
 
The most common interpretation of these results is that relative incomes (relative to a 
reference group) matter more for subjective well-being than absolute incomes (e.g. Easterlin, 
1995; Frey and Stutzer, 2002).
9  Clearly, lower inequality would therefore reduce the well-
being ‘penalty’ the rich impose on the rest and thus lead to higher well-being.  In fact, these 
findings support the notion that, in addition to positional competition, inequality aversion 
                                                 
7 See Oswald (2005) for a note of caution regarding the interpretation of this seemingly log-linear relationship.   
8 There is less clear evidence on what drives differences between countries in reported levels of well-being 
although here average income levels play only a rather minor role.  For interesting papers discussing these 
issues, see Alesina et al. (2004); Clark et al. (005) 
9 See also Frank (2005) for other economic phenomena that are consistent with such a relative income view.   
  6 exists in the sense that high inequality reduces reported well-being so that this adds a second 
factor that supports the notion that greater equity improves well-being.   
 
4) Empirical Implications: Distribution-Adjusted Well-Being Measures 
  
It is possible to combine the insights from the new experimental and subjective well-being 
literature on the one hand with the axiomatic inequality literature started by Atkinson, Sen, 
and others in the 1970s to derive measures of well-being that are sensitive to the distribution 
of incomes to assess the impact inequality has on aggregate well-being.  Efficiency-focused 
analysis would concentrate on increasing the economic pie, usually measured by growth rates 
of GDP per capita, while the findings above would suggest that distributional need to be 
considered when assessing aggregate well-being. 
 
There is a small empirical literature on this topic (e.g. Sen, 1982, Kakwani 1981, Jenkins, 
1997, Chenery and Srinivasan, 1974) which we picked up and extended in a series of recent 
papers (Klasen, 1994, Grün and Klasen, 2001; 2003, 2006).   The basic approach to these 
distribution-adjusted measures is that these measures are based on the following formula: 
  . 1 0 ), 1 ( ≤ ≤ − = I I W µ  
Distribution-adjusted well-being W is a function of mean income µ (i.e. the usual GDP/capita 
indicator often used for international and intertemporal comparisons) reduced by a measure of 
inequality I, where these inequality measures are between 0 and 1 with higher values 
implying higher inequality. Thus, the existing degree of inequality adjusts mean income 
downward to reflect the welfare loss associated with the (unequal) distribution of that mean 
income.  Following Atkinson (1970), W can also be interpreted as the equally-distributed 
equivalent income, i.e. the income that would, if distributed equally, generate the same level 
of well-being as the actual income and the actual (unequal) income distribution.    
  Two types of such distribution-adjustments are considered.  One is based on work by 
Sen (1982) and Dagum (1990) which uses the Gini coefficient as the inequality indicator, 
with the Dagum measure providing an additional penalty for high inequality.  The other type 
of adjustment is based on the work by Atkinson (1970) which is based on a social welfare 
function where agents exhibit inequality aversion, where the amount of inequality aversion is 
driven by a parameter ε.  A ε of 1 implies that a logarithmic social welfare function so that a 
percent increase in income is treated the same regardless of its recipient, while ε = 2, or ε =5 
imply higher inequality aversion.   
  7  There are important axiomatic differences between the two measures which are 
described in detail in Grün and Klasen (2001, 2006) and will not be dealt with here.  The most 
important substantive difference is that the measures that use the Gini coefficient can be 
derived from social welfare functions where relative incomes matter for well-being while the 
Atkinson-based measures are based on formulations where we simply observe a declining 
marginal well-being impact of incomes.  Based on the discussion of the experimental and 
subjective well-being literature, Gini-based measures seem to accord better with the findings 
from these literatures.  Regarding the magnitude of the welfare loss of inequality, it appears 
that the experimental and subjective well-being literature would suggest a ε between 1 and 2 
or the Sen measure as the best approximations (see Grün and Klasen, 2006). 
  It turns out that the incorporation of inequality in the measurement of well-being has a 
very significant impact of our impression of levels of well-being as well as international and 
intertemporal comparisons of well-being.  This will be illustrated with selected findings from 
the papers referred to above.  Table 1 compares per capita income, the indicator most 
commonly used for international comparison of economic performance and well-being, with 
the distribution-adjusted well-being measures.  The distribution-adjusted measures are 
expressed as the ratio of the welfare measure to per capita income shown in the first column 
and thus to the ratio of the equally distributed equivalent income to per capita income.
10  Two 
findings are of particular importance.  First, the well-being penalty of inequality is substantial.  
For example, in Sub Saharan Africa, well-being is only half as high as suggested by per capita 
income using the Sen measure; in Latin America, it is just above 1/3 of per capita incomes 
using the Atkinson ε=2 measure.  Second, large regional differences in inequality translate 
into big differences in relative well-being between the regions.  High inequality in Latin 








                                                 
10 For example, the A1 value of Sub-Saharan Africa is 65.3 which means that the equally distributed equivalent 
income there is only 65.3% as high as the actual per capita income (of $1671).  In other words, well-being in Sub 
Saharan Africa would be as high if per capita income was only 65.3%*1671=1091 and that income was equally 
distributed.      
  8 Table 1: Average Welfare Level by Region 
  GDP/cap   A1   A2   A5   Sen   Dagum  
Sub-Saharan Africa   1671  65.3  46.7  30.0  48.6  32.4  
South Asia   2392  71.3  54.5  38.6  54.0  37.6  
Middle East & North Africa   4430  72.4  55.2  37.0  55.3  38.7  
Latin America & Caribbean   5608  59.4  37.4  20.8  44.6  28.8  
Europe & Central Asia   7907  80.3  66.2  47.6  62.4  45.6  
East Asia & Paciﬁc   8071  70.9  53.4  35.9  53.3  36.7  
High income countries   25848  81.7  67.7  48.6  63.4  46.8  
Notes: based on 101 countries.  A1, A2, and A5 refer to the Atkinson measures with ε=1, 2, 5, respectively.  For details refer 
to Grün and Klasen (2006).  The figures in the distribution-adjusted well-being columns refer to the welfare level using this 
measure as a percentage of per capita incomes (or, equivalently, the equally distributed equivalent income as a percentage of 
per capita income).   
 
This is brought out in Figure 1 where well-being measures in the different regions in 
the year 2000 are being compared to industrialized countries.
11  When using per capita 
incomes, Latin America has reached over 25% of the income levels of industrialized 
countries.  When accounting for inequality, it only reaches about 15% of the well-being levels 
of industrialized countries, again due to much higher inequality than in rich countries.  
Conversely, when inequality is taken due account of, East Asia and the Middle East are on 
similar levels with Latin America, due to much lower inequality in the former regions. 
                                                 
11 For reasons explained in Grün and Klasen (2006), the sample in Figure 1 is considerably smaller than in Table 
1 and is therefore not fully comparable to it.   
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Source: Grün and Klasen (2006).   
 
The consideration of equity as a major factor affecting well-being also affects trends in well-
being over time.  Two particularly dramatic examples are included here.  Figure 2 shows 
well-being losses between 1988 and 1995 in transition countries of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union.  This was a period when output declined sharply in all of them and 
inequality simultaneously increased.  While the output decline (see Y weights in Figure 2) 
already shows dramatic problems for well-being, the inequality increase magnifies this 
welfare loss significantly.  Using inequality adjusted measures, the well-being loss in some of 
the successor states of the Soviet Union was a high as 50-80% in a mere 7 years where the 
inequality increase contributes about half to the overall well-being loss.   
 
Another telling example is to use these distribution-sensitive measures to assess changes in 
well-being in the US from 1960 to 2000 which is shown in Table 3.  Already when using per 
capita incomes, the 1950s and the 1960s led to much higher improvements in well-being than 
the subsequent three decades.    The comparison becomes much more accentuated when the 
distribution-adjusted measures of well-being are used.  In particular, a comparison between 
the 1960s and the 1980s is instructive.  Using per capita incomes, the annual growth in well-
being was about 4 times larger in the 1960s than in the 1990s (3.2% versus 0.8%).  Using the 
  10 Sen measure the difference is much larger, with improvements in well-being in the 1960s 
being 12 times larger than in the 1980s.  Using the Atkinson ε=2 measure, well-being actually 
shrank over the course of the 1980s.  The reason for this diverging performance is, of course, 
that the higher income growth of the 1960s was associated with falling inequality, while the 
much lower growth during the Reagan/Bush era was accompanied with sharply rising 
inequality, which effectively wiped out any gains of the income growth.    
 
These empirical illustrations show that reasonable ways to incorporate distributional concerns 
in the measurement of well-being that are consistent with our findings from the experimental 
and subjective well-being literature lead to very different impressions of levels and changes in 
well-being across space and time.  A critical conclusion here is, as above, that addressing 
equity issues can be critical for promoting efficiency and aggregate well-being.   
 
Figure 2: Well-Being Losses in Transition Countries 


























































































Source: Grün and Klasen (2001) 
 
 












Mean Atkinson (e=1) Atkinson (e=2) Sen  Dagum
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99
 
Notes: Calculations are based on U.S. census data (constant 1982 dollars). Mean refers to the mean money income of families.   
Source: Grün and Klasen (2003). 
 
  5. Inequality-Growth Trade-Offs: Theory and Evidence 
 
While the separation between efficiency and equity issues in neo-classical economics is 
usually justified on conceptual grounds, there is the additional concern that a focus on equity 
and redistribution would come at the cost of promoting greater efficiency, i.e. there is an 
efficiency-equity trade-off, or a closely related growth-inequality trade-off.  If such a trade-off 
existed, clearly this would also partially undermine some of the findings from the previous 
section.  If a focus on reducing income inequality invariably reduced growth, then the ‘cost’ 
of improving equity might be larger than the perceived benefits. 
   
The question of this trade-off is an old one in economics.
 12  Models in the Keynesian as well 
as the neo-classical tradition can yield such trade-offs.  Most arguments surrounding such a 
trade-off center on the role of inequality in the promotion of savings and the provision of 
incentives for effort.  The savings arguments turns on the claim that rich people have a higher 
propensity to save than poor people and thus redistribution from the rich to the poor will 
depress aggregate savings and therefore economic growth.  The incentive argument is more 
focused on the process of redistribution and argues that redistribution via high marginal taxes 
blunts incentives for effort which depresses overall economic growth.   
                                                 
12 See, for example, Lipton and Ravallion (1995), Kanbur (2001) and Deininger and Squire (1998) for a survey 
of these issues.   
  12 While both arguments have some plausibility, their empirical relevance is open to question.  
In particular, there is evidence that the middle classes are actually those with the highest 
propensity to save and they typically fare poorly in a highly unequal society (Ray, 1998).  
Second, while the incentive argument is bound to have some relevance at the extreme 
(payment largely regardless of effort is sure to depress incentives as the experience of 
socialist countries has amply shown), its relevance is less clear when redistributive policies of 
the type undertaken in rich countries are considered (see, for example, Atkinson, 1998).   
  
In the last ten years, a range of models have been proposed that suggest precisely the opposite 
relationship, i.e. that inequality reduces economic growth.  Conversely, reducing income 
inequality might actually promote growth and efficiency.  These models concentrate mainly 
on three issues.  The first one argues that high inequality increases capital market 
imperfections for poor people in the sense that their access to credit and insurance is curtailed.  
This prevents them for engaging in productive investments and forces them to concentrate on 
low risk but low return economic activities, both of which depresses overall growth and 
efficiency (see Galor and Zaira, 1993; Deininger and Squire, 1998; World Bank, 2005).  The 
second argument is focused on political and social stability and argues that high inequality 
reduces both and thus depresses investment and growth (Rodrik, 1999).  The third argument 
turns on the process of redistribution and argues that high inequality will lead to calls for high 
marginal taxation of the median voter (the voter that essentially decides on political 
outcomes) which will then blunt incentives (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). 
   
Given the opposite conclusions from these different sets of models, the relationship between 
inequality and growth becomes largely an empirical question.  Since reliable and (roughly) 
comparable distributional data have only recently become available for a large number of 
countries, investigating this empirical relationship has been the focus of intense debate and 
research in the past decade.  While there are results going in both directions, the 
preponderance of evidence suggests that, if anything, initial inequality seems to be associated 
with reduced economic growth (e.g. Deininger and Squire, 1998; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, 
Lundberg and Squire, 2003).  It also appears that the channel operating via credit market 
imperfections as well as political and social stability appear to be particularly relevant in 
explaining this effect (Deininger and Squire, 1998; World Bank, 2000).  While these findings 
suggest that initial income (and particularly initial asset) inequality is harmful for subsequent 
economic growth, the literature is less conclusive on the impact of redistribution on 
  13subsequent growth (e.g. Forbes, 2000; Banerjee and Duflo, 2003).  Here the results are less 
clear with different studies suggesting opposite conclusions.  This uncertainty is largely 
related to data and estimation issues which are more difficult to solve.  Country-specific 
research has shown that redistribution and distribution-sensitive policies can provide an 
important boost to kick-start development as was the case in many East Asian countries (Fai 
and Ranis, 1988; World Bank, 1993; Timmer, 2006; Grimm, Klasen, and McKay, 2006; 
Ravallion, 2005); they can also lead to lower growth, depending on the instruments chosen for 
redistribution (e.g. Besley and Cord, 2006; Grimm, Klasen, and McKay, 2006).  Even if this 
last point remains contentious, there is little evidence of a clear growth-equity trade-off.  In 
fact, it appears that the opportunities for promoting growth through higher equity are 
considerable, particularly in high inequality regions such as Latin America (e.g. World Bank, 
2006).   
 
A related theoretical and empirical literature investigated whether gender inequality affects 
economic growth.  Here a few models are suggesting that gender inequality in education or 
earnings can lower growth and in fact lead to a self-reinforcing poverty trap (Lagerlöf 2003, 
Galor and Weil 2000).  The empirical literature has found considerable support for such a 
view.  There are now a number of papers that have particularly documented the negative 
impact of gender inequality in education on growth (e.g. Knowles et al. 2002; Yamarik and 
Ghosh, 2003; Klasen, 2002; Klasen and Lamanna, 2003).  The effects are sizable and appear 
to account for a significant portion of the poorer growth performance in past decades in South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Abu-Ghaida and Klasen, 2004).  Also here, greater equity in 




There is a long and proud tradition within economics to think of equity issues from a 
normative perspective.  That tradition has contributed a great deal to the discipline as well as 
to policy discussions.  The continuation of this tradition is clearly advancing the discipline 
itself as well as its role in society.   
 
The argument of this paper was that, in light of the four strands of literature I discussed, it is 
not necessary and useful to confine the topic of equity to normative economics.  In fact, I 
have tried to show that one cannot undertake positive economic analysis focusing on 
  14 efficiency issues without considering equity issues as a central ingredient for economic 
analysis.  The experimental and subjective well-being literature has clearly demonstrated that 
equity concerns affect behavior and well-being, and the empirical implications for 
assessments of well-being (and associated policy choices) are significant.  Moreover, the 
long-suspected trade-off between equity and efficiency does not appear to hold in practice and 
in fact greater equity might be a pre-condition for achieving greater efficiency in many 
contexts.  Thus the reluctance to explicitly consider equity issues in theoretical and applied 
within economics is distorting analysis and policy advice and leads to erroneous and sub-
optimal policy recommendations.   
 
Stating that equity matters for efficiency analyses can only be the starting point for a much 
wider research agenda of how to incorporate equity issues within economic analysis.  Among 
the issues to consider are the types of inequality that appear to matter particularly for well-
being and efficiency (e.g. incomes, assets, education, opportunities, freedoms?, see Sen 
1992), how to adequately model that attitudes towards inequality differ between people and 
settings (see Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), how to model the political economy of inequality, and 
whether the results that are focused on equity within a country also translate to equity 
between countries or at a global level (e.g. Klasen, 2006; World Bank, 2005).  Thus there is 
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